Vernichtungsgedanken

Vernichtungsgedanken, meaning "annihilation thinking" in German, is a Prussian / German strategic doctrine, dating to Frederick the Great. It emphasizes rapid, fluid movement to unbalance an enemy, allowing the attacker to impose his will upon the defender and avoid stalemate. It relies on uncommonly rigorous training and discipline and thoroughly professional leadership. Much of Vernichtungsgedanken can be seen in Clausewitz’ classic treatise “On War”.

This doctrine was used successfully in the War of Austrian Succession, The Seven Years' War, The Napoleonic Wars, The Austro-Prussian War, and The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). The military success of Kingdom of Prussia/Germany was the catalyst of the alliance systems of 19th Century Europe.

The arms races of this period produced the military equipment which eroded the attacker’s advantage during Europe’s “Long Peace”, giving decisive advantage to the defender and setting the stage for the catastrophic stalemate of the First World War. It was the Western Front in this war which ended Vernichtungsgedanken’s long reign as the premiere strategic doctrine of modern warfare.

When the interwar interregnum concluded and Europe went again to war, many of the officers in high command in Germany (chief among them General Heinz Guderian) were all too aware of this doctrinal failure and had specific ideas for its replacement. They had, however, to fight prewar battles to overcome bureaucratic inertia. They mostly won those battles, bringing forth a doctrinal revolution during the Second World War which included the methodology now known as Blitzkrieg. Early enthusiasm for the opportunities provided by tanks and other armored mobile units was referred to in the 1930s as the armored idea.

The last pure Vernichtungsgedanken campaign was the invasion of Poland in 1939.